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This article examines the role of the state in industrial relations, which 
has been highly neglected in the literature. It examines the nature of the 
state and proposes a typology of four distinct roles of the state that affect 
industrial relations: (1) a third party regulator of labor relations; (2) a 
regulator of markets; (3) an establisher of the welfare system; and (4) its 
own employer and policy maker. In doing so, the article sheds light on the 
importance of the concepts of power and politics in industrial relations that 
have been unnoticed by industrial relations orthodoxy; that is, it attempts 
to clarify how each of the four roles of the state affects the power relations 
between labor and management.
Keywords: The state, Regulation, Policy, Labor markets, Welfare, Power 
relations, Industrial relations 
INTRODUCTION
The most widely adopted approach to the analysis of industrial 
relations was proposed by John Dunlop. He declared that an 
industrial relations system consists of three sets of actors: 
(1) managers and their organizations, (2) workers and their 
organizations, and (3) governmental agencies concerned with the 
workplace and the work community (Dunlop 1958). However, 
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the main focus of Dunlop and most writers in the subsequent 
development of the field of industrial relations has been on the 
bipartite relationship between workers and management. The state, 
the third and equally important industrial relations actor, generally 
is neglected. Instead, assumptions about the nature, determinants, 
and implications of state involvement in industrial relations remain 
largely implicit, unexplored, and undefended (Edmund and Frege 
2006; Giles 1989; Keller 1991). 
This neglect creates serious analytical problems as all the systems 
of industrial relations always have been conditioned and shaped by 
state intervention at the moment of their formation and as they have 
expanded or declined (Bordogna and Cella 1999; Jacobs and Dixon 
2003; Sturmthal 1973). The independent nation perspective, with a 
focus on the bilateral relationship, also underestimates the impact 
of international relationships in sustaining national elites and 
influencing their policies (Jessop 2002; Kelly 1998; Woo-Cummings 
1997). Such a view clearly is untenable for most of the postwar 
period, dominated by the Cold War. Either the United States or the 
Soviet Union exerted considerable influence on the economic and 
political affairs of industrializing countries; that is, the competition 
between superpowers provided a critical contextual explanation 
for the role of the state and labor responses to authoritarian rule 
(Frenkel and Harrod 1995; Haggard 1990).
Industrial relations is a social and political invention. The 
role and organization of the state influence the range of choices 
made available to social groups including organized labor and 
management. Such limits on individual and collective choices 
are imposed by institutions, which not only aggregate and codify 
the sum total of individual power available in a polity, but also 
guarantee and reproduce the moral and legal guidelines that 
serve as the ethical foundations for the ordering of preferences in 
society (Buchanan 1995). Therefore, it is highly necessary to adopt 
the concepts of politics and power relations in explaining labor- 
management relations and the patterns of employment rules (Clegg 
1979).
This article attempts to contribute to the field by filling the gap 
in the literature. First, the article defines the state and examines 
the nature of the state. Second, the article proposes a typology of 
four distinct roles of the state that affect industrial relations: (1) a 
third party regulator of labor relations; (2) a regulator of markets; 
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(3) an establisher of the welfare system; and (4) its own employer 
and policy maker. Among the four roles in the typology, the first 
role as a third party regulator of labor relations has been the main 
focus by writers in the literature, but this article goes further to 
analyze the other three roles of the state that have been highly 
overlooked by writers in the literature. Third, the article sheds light 
on the importance of the concepts of power and politics in industrial 
relations that have been unnoticed by industrial relations orthodoxy; 
that is, it attempts to clarify how each of the four distinct roles of 
the state both directly and indirectly affects the power relations 
between labor and management.    
WHAT IS THE STATE?
The state is referred to as a set of continuous administrative, legal, 
bureaucratic, and coercive systems, headed, and more or less well 
coordinated, by an executive authority (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985). The state is an endogenous player of an industrial 
relations system, interacting with the economic system as a coher-
ent cluster of institutions rather than a neutral, omnipotent agent 
exogenously attached to the economic system with the mission of re-
solving its coordination failures (Aoki, Murdock, and Okuno-Fujwara 
1997; Giles 1989). The overlap between the aims of state policy and 
the interests of any of the major social groups is both partial and 
contingent, since states rarely pursue economic growth and/or wel-
fare for their own sake, but rather as a means to their own political 
and military ends. In any particular situation, states’ interests are 
powerfully shaped, if not determined, by objective features of their 
social, economic, and geopolitical environments that define the con-
stellation of threats and opportunities facing their rulers (Tilly 1985; 
Zeitlin 1985). 
States must fulfill both functions of capital accumulation and of 
legitimacy as an agency of citizens, and this balancing act requires a 
certain autonomy and discretion on the part of the state. States vary 
enormously in their autonomy, coherence, and capacity to impose 
their will on their subjects since they are historically constructed 
organizations (Woo-Cummings 1997). The strength of the state de-
pends on how effectively the state can restructure its relations to 
social groups, as well as relations among those groups. Since few 
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states are all-powerful, they normally need to collaborate with a va-
riety of social groups (including employers and workers) in achieving 
their policy objectives. As such, the potential for conflict between 
the state and any of the major social groups always is present (Aoki 
1997), and thus the state bears the burden of legitimizing its poli-
cies and actions that might be against interests of any of the major 
social groups. 
The state can play a vital role in shaping economic and industrial 
relations systems, but this is particularly true in the early stages of 
economic development (Black 2001; Clegg 1976). When the economy 
is underdeveloped, the availability of intermediaries is limited, firms’ 
capabilities are modest, and even the efficiency of markets is ham-
pered by poor integration and the underdevelopment of property-
rights arrangements in the economy. Under these circumstances, 
the ability of the private sector to solve challenging coordination 
problems is limited, and state policy may play a more significant 
role in facilitating development (Aoki 1997). By the same logic, there 
is a larger window of opportunity for the state to affect the pattern 
of industrial relations at the early stage of the collective bargaining 
era when, with rapid unionization, a national industrial relations 
system is being formed. As a certain type of an industrial relations 
system is institutionalized, it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
state to overturn the prevailing form (Jeong and Aguilera 2008).
THIRD PARTY REGULATOR OF LABOR RELATIONS
States perform several distinct roles that affect industrial relations. 
Among them, this section analyzes the role of the state as a third-
party regulator: (1) promotion of a legal framework that establishes 
general ground rules in the procedures for collective bargaining; (2) 
regulation of the use of union sanctions and management sanctions; 
and (3) involvement into alternative dispute resolution processes 
to handle or avoid an impasse in collective bargaining. This section 
also illuminates how this role of the state affects the power relations 
between organized labor and management. 
Establishment of the legal framework
A primary role of the state is to act as a third-party regulator 
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promoting a legal framework that establishes general ground rules 
or union-management interaction particularly in the procedures 
for collective bargaining. This typically involves defining the status, 
rights, and obligations of the actors and prescribing and enforcing 
the “rules of the game” (Bean 1994; Van Waarden 1995). The law 
specifies who may negotiate such agreements, often linking this 
to the registration or certification of trade unions and employers’ 
associations, and whether collective agreements apply only to 
firms (and indeed workers) that are members of the signatory 
organizations, or more generally. The law defines what the parties 
agree to and what they can expect from their contract, as well as 
the limits within which economic activity occurs and the range of 
acceptable practices. In many countries, the law also prescribes 
obligatory mechanisms for collective employee representation at the 
company or workplace level, imposing an obligation on management 
to consult the representatives over key business and personnel 
policies (Belman and Belzer 1997; Hyman 2008).
The extent of union density and collective bargaining is, to a 
large degree, a function of this legal framework. Union density may 
be affected by the way labor laws regulate employer opposition to 
unions, establish union recognition, and promote union security 
provisions. The decision to become a union member is the outcome 
of comparing the private benefits and costs anticipated, and these 
benefits and costs are influenced, directly or indirectly, by the 
attitude that the state takes toward unions. Where the state adopts 
an unequivocal policy of encouragement, union membership and 
collective bargaining expand, as it reduces employers’ ability to 
resist unions and thus lowers the costs of union membership (Offe 
and Wiesenthal 1980). Therefore, a low level of union density and 
limited practices of collective bargaining are the result, at least in 
part, of less than enthusiastic state support (Adams 1993).
Perhaps, the most obvious example of the encouragement effect 
is the Wagner Act, enacted in 1935 in the United States. With the 
rise of large-scale industry and giant trusts in the last part of the 
19th century, the balance of power tipped substantially in favor 
of employers. The growth in company unions was staggering. 
Employers signed up more than a million workers in these 
artificial organizations. With a centralized administration, these 
sham organizations made policies covering a variety of important 
matters; and the illusion of employee participation gave the outward 
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appearance that employees had effective representation in these 
organizations. The apparent purpose of these sham organizations 
was to keep out autonomous unions that were attempting to 
organize employees (LeRoy 1998).
The U.S. government enacted the Wagner Act to support both 
the unions and the practice of collective bargaining to revitalize 
the depressed economy. It recognized that employer denials of 
the employees’ right to organize and employer refusal to accept 
collective bargaining previously had led to strikes and industrial 
conflicts. It also acknowledged that inequality of bargaining power 
between employees and employers affected the flow of commerce 
and aggravated recurring economic depressions by depressing 
wages and purchasing power and thereby prevented the stability of 
wages and working conditions. Further, it recognized that protection 
by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
would promote the flow of commerce, restore equality of bargaining 
power, and encourage friendly adjustment of industrial disputes 
(Holley and Jennings 1980). The act made illegal many of the tactics 
still used by employers to thwart unionization and company unions 
(Pencavel 2003). 
In this new legal environment, there was a rapid unionization 
of workers and a dramatic increase in the practice of collective 
bargaining. From 1935 to 1947, union membership went from 3 
million to 15 million, with some industries having 80 percent of 
their employees under collective bargaining agreements (Hardin et 
al. 2002). During the 1960s and 1970s the growth of public sector 
unionism likewise followed the spread of Wagner-like legislation 
covering government workers in many states (Heckscher 1988). 
If the Wagner Act did not stop employers from creating sham 
organizations, there would likely be fewer unions with many more 
company unions (LeRoy 1998). 
The Wagner Act also shaped substantive outcomes on the form 
and character of labor organization that would thereafter prevail 
in the American labor movement. The organizational principles of 
the old AFL, which had sustained an autonomous movement in 
craft shops, were insufficient for the task of confronting the growing 
mass-production industries (Barbash 1984a). The Wagner Act’s 
early support of inclusive units, however, undoubtedly advanced 
the fortunes of the industrial unions in their challenge to the craft 
union hegemony. The early decisions of the NLRB on bargaining 
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units favored industrial unions, comprising an entire factory of firm, 
over craft units that included only particular categories of workers 
(Sinyai 2006). The act set off the collective bargaining revolution in 
the mass-production industry, and in effect took responsibility for 
the survival of unionism; without it, the CIO would not have been 
possible (Heckscher 1988). Certifying unions on a plant-by-plant 
basis, it made the possibility of multi-employer bargaining very 
difficult in the United States, however (Adams 1995). 
Working in the other direction, the U.S. government revised the 
basic labor law to restrict labor’s power, and the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947 seriously harmed several strong unions (Burtt 1979). The 
Taft-Hartley amendments gave states the right to outlaw union shop 
requirements in collective bargaining agreements with what are 
euphemistically called “right-to-work” laws. In a state with a right-
to-work provision, labor contracts that make union membership 
compulsory cannot be legally enforced (Feldacker 1990). In theory, a 
union in a right-to-work law state is severely handicapped because 
potential members can “free ride” (Olson 1968). Workers receive 
benefits from union activities without joining the union and bearing 
its costs because the Wagner Act prohibits treating otherwise 
equivalent non-union employees differently from members. Unions 
that operate in right-to-work states are less secure because large 
percentages of U.S. workers will not join unions unless they are 
compelled (Jacobs and Dixon 2003). Indeed, studies attribute the 
declining American union density to the lack of a labor law regime 
supportive of unionization (Allen 1994; Weiler 1990).
From a comparative perspective, Canadian unionization has 
remained stable in aggregate for the past decades despite various 
predictions that Canadian union density would follow the American 
pattern of decline. Though both countries have adopted certain 
common principles, significant differences were present at the 
outset or emerged over time. Despite its adoption of PC 1003 
a decade later, the Canadian state acted more aggressively in 
regulating labor relations. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments 
caused some of the rupture in common approaches (e.g., enabling 
right to work, altering the structure and duties of the labor board), 
and provincial legislation subsequent to PC 1003 further advanced 
the discrepancies. These differences include the rapidity with which 
unions are certified, the ability of boards to impose certifications, 
guaranteeing rights to striking workers, and the philosophy 
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underlying the determination of employer unfair practices during 
union organizing drives (Godard 2002; Taras 1997). After all, the 
effectiveness of the administration of regulation rather than the 
adoption of the labor legislation itself matters in outcome measures, 
as observed by Commons and Andrews (1936: 448): “More important 
than the hasty enactment of additional laws is the adoption of 
methods of administration that will enforce them. It is easy for 
politicians or reformers or trade union officials to boast of the laws 
which they have secured for labor, and it is just as easy to overlook 
details or appropriations or competent officials that are needed to 
make them enforceable.” 
Regulation of union and management sanctions
Another primary role of the state is to regulate the use of union 
sanctions (e.g., picketing, secondary boycotts) and management 
sanctions (e.g., injunctions, lockouts). Collective bargaining is 
predicated on the recognition by a party of the existence and rights 
of the other party and on the corollary recognition that each party 
must at times compromise and adjust its position to the others in 
the face of the economic pressures of the market. If both parties 
to a dispute are unable to agree peacefully, a test of economic 
strength by strike or lockout will resolve the issue (Burtt 1979). 
Both parties to a dispute, however, have a strong incentive to avoid 
the occurrence of a strike, as each loses income. During a strike 
workers give up forgone wages. They try to make up for those lost 
earnings by possibly taking short-time jobs, while turning to union 
strike benefits, the earnings of a spouse, or savings to support 
themselves and their families. Firms lose forgone profits during a 
strike. They try to lessen the amount of profits lost through tactics 
such as bringing in replacement workers for the strikers, making 
sales out of any available inventories, or shifting production to 
an alternative site. They also rely on assets or the earnings from 
other lines of business to meet any financial obligations (such as 
equipment expenses) (Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 2008).
Beyond the impact on the parties directly involved in a dispute, 
strikes also affect the public more or less, depending upon the type 
of industry, the relative number of workers involved, and the strike’s 
timing and duration. In particular, strikes can have an immediate 
detrimental impact on the welfare of the public in industries whose 
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products are perishable (such as milk), essential to daily life (such 
as gas for heating and cooking), or vital to national survival (such 
as electric power). An industrial dispute involving a relatively large 
number of workers also is likely to be burdensome to the public. For 
example, when the dominant plant in a community is shut down, 
the loss of the weekly payroll can hurt merchants, suppliers, loan 
collections of financial institutions, and even the flow of tax funds 
to the community. Similarly, an industrywide strike can have great 
repercussions upon the economy as a whole. The longer a strike 
continues, the greater will be its effect upon the public (Burtt 1979). 
The state therefore regulates the use of both union and management 
sanctions.
State regulation toward unions and collective bargaining varies 
a great deal. The spectrum of state regulation toward unions and 
collective bargaining ranges from suppression through toleration 
to encouragement (Rimlinger 1977). It also varies according to the 
amount of regulation. At one end of the spectrum, the state may 
allow labor and management to work out their relations; at the 
other end, it may decide to specify in detail both the substantive and 
procedural rules of the employment relationship (Adams 1993). The 
strike is the key weapon of unions (especially industrial unions), and 
changes in law and court interpretations can narrow the permissible 
use of economic weapons by banning most sympathy strikes, 
slowdowns, and stoppages during the life of a contract. The net 
effect of these and other rulings is to confine the strike to a narrow 
channel making it highly formal and predictable. These rules tend 
to favor the employer that can prepare for such eventualities by 
stockpiling and moving work at the expense of workers, whose most 
effective weapon often is surprise. The promotion of peace therefore 
generally tends to unbalance the power relationship (Heckscher 
1988). 
For example, by enacting the national emergency provisions in 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the U.S. state curtailed its regulation of free 
collective bargaining. In examining the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
main survey of large work stoppages, LeRoy and Johnson (2001) 
found that the downward trend in strike activity in the U.S. that so 
often is attributed to Reagan actually began at the end of the period 
in which Taft-Hartley injunctions were ordered. Taft-Hartley orders 
were designed to motivate the vast power of the U.S. presidency 
to rally public opinion against a threat to the nation’s health and 
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welfare—in this case, a labor union on strike for better pay and 
working conditions. Taft-Hartley injunctions seriously harmed 
several strong unions—most notably, those in the steel, longshoring, 
and maritime industries. In nearly every case, they lost their strikes, 
suffered losses at the bargaining table, and incurred a loss of good 
reputation. 
Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration
Negotiations do not always yield an agreement. If you are buying a 
car and the dealer will not accept your highest offer, there is no sale. 
The same happens in collective bargaining when employers and 
unions cannot agree on terms of new contracts. The failure to reach 
agreement is called an impasse. Unlike a car purchase, unions 
are not free to find new employers to deal with, and employers still 
must be willing to negotiate with their employees’ representatives 
(Fossum 2006). An impasse also may threaten the interests of the 
public. When the public fears that its interests are affected, or about 
to be affected, by a strike, some form of state intervention usually 
is demanded (Burtt 1979). Therefore, the state acts as a conciliator, 
mediator or arbitrator in conflicts between the social partners in 
order to handle or avoid breakdowns in collective bargaining in most 
countries. 
Conciliation is an alternative dispute resolution process that helps 
the disputing parties resolve their dispute in mutual consultation. 
Mediation is another alternative method of resolution whereby 
a neutral and impartial third party, the mediator, facilitates 
dialogue in a structured multi-stage process to help parties reach 
a conclusive and mutually satisfactory agreement. Arbitration is 
another alternative dispute resolution process whereby the disputing 
parties present their disagreement to one or more arbitrators, who 
have the final binding authority. Mediation, for example, may be 
carried out at an informal level, with the state trying to get the top 
brass of the central organizations of employers and workers together 
to forge a social contract or intervening in strikes to encourage the 
parties to sit down and negotiate. Special mediation services also 
may be set up at a formal level. Such services are available in most 
countries, but their powers vary greatly, which is reflected in the 
extent to which the parties concerned are free to choose to go to 
mediation (Van Waarden 1995). 
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In summary, a primary role of the state is to act as a third-party 
regulator. It promotes a legal framework that establishes general 
ground rules in the procedures for collective bargaining, regulates 
the use of union sanctions and management sanctions, and acts 
as a conciliator, mediator or arbitrator in conflicts between the 
social partners in order to handle or avoid breakdowns in collective 
bargaining. This role of the state is significant in itself, but the 
importance of this role to industrial relations is enlarged when 
we consider its impact on the power relations between organized 
labor and management; it determines to a large degree substantive 
outcomes, such as the extent of union density and collective 
bargaining, the form and character of labor organization, and even 
the survival of organized labor. 
REGULATOR OF MARKET
A labor market is a distinctively artificial creation, and its 
character reflects structures, conventions, and practices that vary 
with time and place. State policy does much to explain this variation. 
The creation of the conditions under which labor power is sold thus 
historically has been one of the basic and unchanging functions of 
the state (Hyman 2008). This section examines this role of the state 
as a regulator of markets: (1) establishment of labor standards; (2) 
regulation of wage-price mechanisms; and (3) improvement of labor 
market institutions. In doing so, it elucidates how this role of the 
state affects the power relations between workers and management.
Establishment of labor standards
In all countries, the state sets labor standards, such as working 
hours, minimum wages, health, and safety. With the rise of large-
scale industry and giant trusts in the late 19th century, the balance 
of power tipped substantially in favor of employers. Within a given 
legal and economic context, the employer could do more than simply 
to hire workers and let them work as they please. The inequality of 
bargaining power between the individual worker and the employer 
was the fundamental source of labor problems. The purpose of 
legislated labor standards was to compensate for this lack of 
bargaining power by ensuring working conditions sufficient to afford 
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workers the accepted social standard of living (Bowles 1985; Burton 
and Chelius 1997).
The institutionalists were the earliest to systematically develop 
a theoretical rationale for employment regulation and were among 
the most active and prominent advocates of such legislation. 
Institutionalists argue that real labor markets seldom confirm to 
the way the neoclassical theory says they do, but instead are full of 
defects and imperfections that nullify the theory. Individual workers 
have little bargaining leverage unless they cannot be replaced. They 
also lack the knowledge of the market the theory presumes, and 
family obligations make them immobile. They are not atomistic, 
independent sellers of labor but interdependent members of ethnic, 
racial, and gender groups that are easily divided (Craypo 1997; 
Kaufman 1997a). 
According to institutionalists, individual workers therefore face 
“competitive menaces” when sustained market expansion alters 
traditional employment relations and pits them against employers, 
who in turn compete by driving down labor standards (Commons 
1909). The competition of the worst employers tends to drag down 
the best employers to their level through ethically and economically 
unfair trade practices, such as skimming on safety or sanity 
expenditures; and replacing skilled workers with impoverished 
immigrants or child labor. The inability of high-standard employers 
to resist the forces of unfair competition is called the “problem of 
the twentieth man”; that is, even when nineteen employers wish 
to increase the working standards in their plants, the recalcitrant 
twentieth employer, which refuses to go along, threatens the 
competitive position of the rest and prevents them all from doing 
so (Kaufman 1997a). The state therefore assumes a responsible 
interventionist role to create “a floor for employer behavior in the 
labor market” (Weil 1997: 430).
Beyond the function of establishing labor standards, the state also 
could set wage levels with less regard to the profitability, or external 
competitive position, of the individual industries concerned, as 
even in the case of consultations between labor, management, and 
the state, ultimate decision-making power is retained by the state. 
Arbitration as a method of centralized wage-fixing is to utilize social 
and equity criteria in terms of setting a structure of basic wages 
providing for minimum needs together with a superstructure of 
largely determined differential margins for skills (Adams 1993).
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State regulation of certain minimum standards in areas such 
as occupational safety and health is common in all countries, but 
regulative legislation dealing with wages, working hours, and other 
major conditions is more uneven across countries. In continental 
European countries state regulation has played a greater part in 
determining wages, working conditions, and fringe benefits than 
in either the UK or the U.S. and therefore the political process has 
assumed a critical role. In Germany, for example, there has been 
an old tradition of state intervention and regulation in economic 
life. Statutory norms provide a floor of minimum standards for 
German workers including wages, hour, vacations, job security, and 
safety provisions that the unions have come to regard as a body of 
irreversible social rights (Bean 1994; Jackson 2003; Jacobi, Keller, 
and Müller-Jentsch 1998).
Intervention of wage-price mechanisms
Although the state’s role in labor markets is most obvious in 
policies that structure the employment relationship or regulate 
specific practices and markets, product market regulation has 
equally great, albeit less direct, effects on workers as changes in 
product markets act on labor markets through derived demand. 
Macroeconomic policymakers’ decisions on money supply and 
interest rates can have large effects on employment and wages 
throughout the economy (Belman and Belzer 1997). A tight 
monetary policy works against inflation by curtailing investment and 
consumer borrowing and expenditure, and affects unemployment 
and both the ease with which employers can attract and retain 
qualified employees and wages and working conditions. The 
ultimate effect is on union claims. For example, late in the Carter 
administration and during the Reagan years, high interest rates 
brought an inflow of investment funds, thus bidding up the dollar. 
Imports were subsidized, exports penalized, and American industrial 
strength was deeply impaired. The movement of industry to other 
countries was abetted, in fact subsidized. It was perhaps no comfort 
to unions that the situation was no less disastrous for employers 
(Galbraith 1994). 
Conversely, discretionary fiscal policy offers a remedy for a 
deficiency in aggregate demand and can reverse an economic 
downturn. The impact of new money spent by governments for 
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public transit systems, housing, new energy sources, grants-in-aid 
to cities, or defense contracts will add immediately to someone’s 
income, and as the income is spent and respent by the receivers, the 
aggregate effect will be larger than the original outlay. Similarly, a 
tax cut will add immediately to the disposable income of taxpayers 
and boost the aggregate level of layout and employment (Burtt 1979). 
“Full” employment and economic growth affect the balance of power 
within the labor market and also the margins for negotiation within 
collective bargaining (Hyman 2008). Low unemployment and active 
labor market policies (e.g., high unemployment benefits, generous 
training and relocation programs) create conditions conducive to a 
high-commitment sociotechnical systems approach (Godard 2002). 
Tight labor markets are associated with improvements in workforce 
quality and productivity because employers have a greater incentive 
to efficiently use labor and to reward human capital investments 
of workers though career ladders, internal training, development 
programs, and so on (Burtt 1979). 
Competitiveness policies, which establish the scope and rules of 
competition, also are increasingly important to the performance of 
labor markets. Legislation on the extent of and access to markets—
such as laws governing imports, exports, and immigration—and 
laws governing market conduct—such as those concerning dumping 
and anti-trust—establish the competitive position of firms and of 
their employees (Belman and Belzer 1997). Relaxed trade restrictions 
essentially render employers more mobile and hence may make 
the workplace more readily “disposable” so that employees become 
fearful of job loss and effectively are coerced to cooperate in 
workplace change programs, enabling employers to rely on a lower- 
cost “control” approach rather than a higher-cost “commitment” 
approach. Relaxed trade restrictions could also allow employers 
to engage in more aggressive practices toward unions, using this 
mobility to extract concessions from unions with regard to collective 
agreement provisions and from states with regard to labor law and 
standards (Godard 2002).
Improvement of labor market institutions
Demand management of labor markets may be a necessary but 
insufficient means to “full” employment. Unless the supply and 
demand of different types of competence are in balance, there are 
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likely to be shortages of certain types of labor (or in specific parts of 
a country) while unemployment remains relatively high among some 
occupational groups or regions. State intervention into “supply-side” 
labor markets is seen as necessary to correct such imbalance (Hyman 
2008). The state thus attempts to improve labor market institutions 
(e.g., training, education, employment services) that shape the 
capacities bought by employees.
Where efficiency requires investments and cooperation among 
employers, the price system creates strong incentives for firms to 
utilize the resulting industry benefits without paying for them. 
Without barriers to such conduct, free-riding firms will be able 
to provide goods and services at reduced prices. Over time, other 
employers are compelled either to forgo shared investment activities 
or leave the market. Faced with the threat of free-riding competitors, 
few employers are willing to invest in collective provisions. Only a 
collective actor who can prevent free-riding practices will be able to 
provide these services. The state can be one such actor, though the 
employees’ associations and unions may also take on this role. This 
is why collective services have become an issue requiring regulation 
within the industrial relations framework (Belman and Belzer 1997; 
Olson 1968).
Vocational and educational training is provided on a free or 
subsidized basis by the state in many countries; alternatively or in 
addition, many states provide incentives to employers to undertake 
in-house training. Such measures obviously enhance a country’s 
skills basis (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). In Germany, for example, 
the government, employers, and employees carry joint responsibility 
for basic vocational training (15- to 18-year-olds) and have developed 
a dual educational system. Besides practical training on the shop 
floor, students receive theoretical education at school, for which 
employers must give them time off. Once they have passed the 
compulsory school year, the large majority of pupils enter into an 
apprenticeship contract with a company. All participating companies 
are obliged to have staff who can teach students in the workshop 
available. The government’s contribution consists mainly of financial 
support and some measure of statutory pressure. Companies are 
legally obliged to join an Industriekammer (Chamber of Commerce) 
or Handwerkskammer (Chamber of Trade). These chambers have 
public law status and their rights and duties are laid down by 
statute. Free riding is not an attractive option, since companies are 
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prohibited from hiring workers under 18 without offering them an 
apprenticeship contract (Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 2008; Streeck 
1987). 
In sum, one of the fundamental functions of the state is to 
regulate markets. The state sets labor standards and sometimes 
wage levels with less regard to the profitability of the industries to 
create a floor for employer behavior in the labor market. The state 
also regulates money supply and interest rates, and this function of 
the state has equally great, albeit less direct, effects on employment 
and workers as changes in product markets act on labor markets 
through derived demand. Faced with the free-rider problem among 
employers, the state invests into labor market institutions such 
as training, education, and employment services that shape the 
capacities bought by employees. The purpose of legislated labor 
standards is to compensate for the lack of individual workers’ 
bargaining power. The other functions of the state to achieve 
“full” employment and economic growth affect not only employers’ 
business strategies, human resource policies, and labor policies, but 
also the balance of power within the labor market and the margins 
for negotiation within collective bargaining.
WELFARE STATE
This section investigates the role of the state as an establisher 
of the welfare regime, while illustrating how this role of the state 
influences the position of workers both individually and collectively 
in industrial relations. The role discussed here comprises welfare 
provisions and protection of individual employment rights.  
Welfare Provision
The state provides social insurance against such risks as 
illness, disablement, unemployment, poverty, and old age. Social 
insurance is made necessary by the fact that private markets do 
not provide adequate protection at a reasonable cost for many 
types of employment-related risks. The reason is due to two market 
failures known today as “moral hazard” (people have an incentive 
to purposely engage in the risky behavior in order to qualify for 
benefits) and “adverse selection” (the people most likely to suffer the 
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risk are the ones most likely to buy coverage). If workers are to have 
access to employment-related insurance, then it falls on the state to 
establish and operate the program (Kaufman 1997a). 
The role of the state in creating (either actively or by abstention) a 
regime of welfare provision, and a broader conception of citizenship, 
shapes the basis on which workers enter the labor market. Any 
significant system of “decommodification”—the institutional 
protection of the labor force from total dependence for survival at 
the discretion of the employer—strengthens the position of workers 
both individually and collectively, facilitating the emergence and 
stability of collectivized industrial relations. For this very reason, in 
some countries early trade unions (particularly of skilled workers) 
provided their own “friendly benefits” in order to shield members 
against the contingencies of their working lives. In general this 
function was displaced by the rise of the welfare state, but as part of 
this process the trade unions in some countries (sometimes together 
with employers) obtained a key role in the administration of public 
welfare (Hyman 2008).
The welfare regime takes very different forms in different 
countries, not only in terms of the balance between public and 
private provision but also in the nature and extent of integration 
between its governance and the industrial relations actors. Outside 
Europe, state provision often is extremely limited. In Japan, major 
firms often provide extensive welfare benefits. The Unites States 
also is notable for the existence of relatively generous provisions by 
individual employers, often the outcome of collective bargaining. 
But such benefits, being company-based, recently have been under 
widespread attack, and their coverage has declined in parallel with 
trade union membership (Inagami and Whittaker 2005; Jacobi 
2005). 
In recent years, established welfare systems have been under 
challenge in many countries, as a result of demographic changes, 
constrained public finances and an ideological shift toward 
liberation and “activation” (Lind and Møller 2006). The welfare 
state reduced employment by offering incentives to older workers 
to leave the labor market for early retirement, affecting trade 
unions whose membership gradually grew older on average. Since 
early retirement programs and disability pensions are paid out of 
contributions of those employed, unit labor costs increased while 
wages remained stagnant. As non-wage labor costs began to make 
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national economies non-competitive, employers and governments 
sought massive productivity increases, which often resulted in even 
more publicly-funded early retirement. Where welfare has been an 
accepted part of the industrial relations agenda, this has imposed 
serious challenges to the stability of the whole industrial relations 
system (Ferner and Hyman 1998; Streeck and Hassel 2003).
Individual Employment Rights 
The law generally conceives of the employment relationship as 
a contract between employer and employee. This is coupled with 
the notion of freedom of contract (based on the assumptions of 
perfect rationality, foresight, and information on the part of both 
employer and employee), as well as the assumption that both parties 
have equal bargaining power. These assumptions are particularly 
influential in the context of individual aspects of law, but it usually 
is only in the context of collective action that these assumptions 
can be more directly addressed, and mitigated. It is unreasonable 
to assume that an individual employee can bargain equal terms 
with an employer that may well be a giant corporation (Deakin and 
Njoya 2008). Therefore, the state has the right and indeed duty to 
define standards that must be observed in all employment contracts 
to prevent unequal bargaining power resulting in unreasonable 
conditions.
Employment law covers all rights and obligations within 
the employment relationship (whether current employees, job 
applicants, or former employees). Because of the complexity of 
the employment relationship and the wide variety of situations 
that can arise, employment law involves issues as diverse as 
discrimination, wrongful termination and retaliation, fair working 
hours and compensation, workplace safety, harassment of all 
types, privacy, defamatory references, and credit or background 
check (Oppenheimer 2004; Walsh 2004). These issues are governed 
by applicable state law or contract law (when the employment 
relationship is based on a valid contract entered into by the 
employer and the employee), but the most significant is equal 
employment opportunity laws. 
 Equal employment opportunity laws attempt to correct social 
problems of interest to particular groups of workers, called protected 
classes. A protected class consists of individuals who share some 
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characteristics in common, such as their race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, or disability status. These individuals are 
protected from discrimination because of the characteristics they 
have in common. The laws influence all of the HRM functions, 
including recruitment, selection, performance appraisal, training 
opportunities, promotion, and compensation (Bohlander and Snell 
2007; Kelly, Holmes, and Hayward 2005). 
In the United States, the broadest and most significant of the 
antidiscrimination legislation is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. The act bars discrimination in all HR activities. Other major 
federal laws cover each of the protected classes. The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 protects women from employment 
discrimination. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits 
employment discrimination against job applicants and employees 
aged over forty. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires 
employers that have federal contracts of $2,500 or more to take 
affirmative action toward qualified handicapped individuals. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of disability in hiring and in all terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment (Fisher, Schoenfeldt, and Shaw 1996; 
Kelly, Holmes, and Hayward 2005). 
In Europe, a clear trend of tighter regulation for equal treatment 
also has been since the 1980s. The principle of equal treatment 
has been extended to more and more aspects of employment and 
to all forms of employment contracts. More recent aspects of equal 
opportunities policy are positive action and protection from sexual 
harassment. Furthermore, measures that aim at better coordination 
of private and professional life (e.g., parental or child care leave) 
have been introduced (Falkner and Emmerich 1994).
All states define some individual employment rights that limit 
the parameters of individual contracts, but there is great variation 
in the scope of such regulation and the rigor of its enforcement. 
Divergence across labor law systems is in part the legacy of the 
common law/civil law divide, but it also reflects variations in the 
timing of industrialization, the forms of worker organization, and 
the nature of industrial enterprise in different countries (Deakin and 
Njoya 2008). 
In short, the state provides individual workers with social 
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insurance against employment-related risks to collect market 
failures (“moral hazard” and “adverse selection”) and sets all rights 
and obligations of individual workers within the employment 
relationship. In particular, equal employment opportunity laws 
attempt to correct social problems of interest to particular groups 
of workers, called protected classes. This role of the state to protect 
the labor force from total dependence for survival at the discretion 
of the employer not only influences all of the HRM functions, but 
also strengthens the position of workers both individually and 
collectively, facilitating the emergence and stability of collectivized 
industrial relations.
EMPLOYER AND POLICY MAKER
Lastly, the state is a contracting party itself in its capacity as 
employer of public and semi-public servants. In most countries, 
the state is by far the largest single employer, and deals with 
organizations representing its employees: civil servants and 
employees working in the military, law enforcement, the subsidized 
sectors, and state companies. The role of the state as employer 
depends on several aspects of governance, including questions 
regarding the functions of the state, the organizations through 
which the state operates, and the adopted management approach. 
The specific model of governance a state chooses to undertake 
affects the scope of its employment both directly and indirectly. The 
state decides how it manages its workforce, selecting a model of 
staffing, compensation, and employee involvement that it wants to 
follow. Over the years, it has introduced an ever-increasing number 
of rules determining the legal position and terms of employment of 
its own employees (Van Waarden 1995).
“Social” or “moral” sanctions are at least as effective as the threat 
of legal compulsion (Kahn-Freund 1954). States serve as exemplars 
through their own employment policies, establishing the cognitive 
and normative rules that undergird employer decision processes, 
the broader economic and social context within which employers 
act, and ultimately, the relations of authority constituting the 
employment relation itself with important implications for employer 
orientations and practices (Kochan and Osterman 1994). 
A notable example would be the impact of Reagan labor policy 
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during the 1980s in the United States. Ronald Reagan forcefully 
argued that the nation’s social and economic problems had been 
exacerbated, not ameliorated, by growing government intervention 
in the economy. Reagan effectively turned public dissatisfaction with 
high inflation, eroding industrial competitiveness, and declining 
standards of living into an attack on the New Deal ideology by 
persuading a substantial portion of the electorate that the best 
antidote to these problems is greater reliance on free markets 
and less reliance on government and other forms of employment 
regulation (e.g., collective bargaining). These new priorities played 
themselves out during the Reagan and Bush presidencies of the 
1980s and early 1990s (Barbash 1984b; Kaufman 1997b). This 
political “take-away and give-back” strategy, from the union 
viewpoint, fostered not only a tax-free, but also a regulation-
free and, as part of that, a union-free environment to encourage 
business to invest. Reagan spokesmen argued, however, that 
these policies would eventually redound to the union advantage by 
encouraging a favorable investment climate and, as a consequence, 
a favorable employment condition (Barbash 1984a; Keller 1991). 
In reality, public policy toward collective bargaining certainly 
turned hostile, evidenced by the events such as the Reagan 
administration’s hard-line stance in the air traffic controllers’ 
strike, administration opposition to striker replacement legislation, 
and a series of important pro-management rulings by the NLRB. 
Rhetoric against “big government” also intensified, including 
attacks on various regulatory programs in the labor area, such as 
affirmative action, unemployment compensation, the minimum 
wage, and the Davis-Bacon Act (the setting of “prevailing wages” 
in government construction projects). In this context, the business 
community certainly rose in stature and gained new power and 
influence, resulting in the growth in employer anti-union practices 
during these years. Unions suffered political defeats in the past, 
but never before had they felt as totally excluded from the centers 
of government power as they were. While no pro-labor statuses 
were repealed outright, an equivalent effect, without the political 
turmoil, was accomplished through administrative regulation and 
the appointment process (Dubofsky 1994; Kaufman 1997b; Shostak 
and Skocik 1986).
As its counterpart in the United States, the British government 
played a significant role in shaping the fate of trade unions, in 
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periods of both strength and weakness (Howell 1995). Despite the 
absence of extensive legislation, the policy of British governments 
has not been neutral, as the policy of voluntarism is sometimes 
interpreted to imply. In fact, British policy has been to encourage 
collective bargaining. It has done so by notifying all public servants 
that collective bargaining is the preferred means of establishing 
conditions of work, by requiring government suppliers to recognize 
the freedom of their workers to join unions and encourage collective 
bargaining, and by intervening directly in many disputes in order 
to pressure intransigent employers to recognize unions and to 
negotiate with them (Adams 1993). Many observers thus often credit 
government normative support for collective bargaining for union 
density levels of approximately 57 percent by the late 1970s, despite 
a lack of effective statutory protections in the United Kingdom (Howell 
1995; Katz and Darbishire 2000). 
Philosophically, the Thatcher government in the UK was very 
close to that of Reagan in its belief that “market forces” should be 
able to operate with a minimum of constraint. The objective of the 
anti-union legislation introduced by the Thatcher government in 
the 1980s was to provide business executives with greater flexibility 
so that they could respond more effectively to labor-market signals 
(Adams 1993). The state initiated political provisions towards 
gradual “deregulation” of parts of the existing industrial relations 
system, as employers initiated their strategies of flexibilization. 
The state downsized the public sector, introduced contingent 
employment arrangements, and contracted out to reinforce the 
adoption of low-cost policies in the private sector, while promoting 
a shift in employer attitudes away from a more paternalistic and 
voluntaristic orientation that included a role for labor, toward one 
emphasizing an enterprise culture in which there was not only little 
role for labor but also an erosion of the principle of comparability 
that had been important to wage-setting processes under preceding 
regimes (Godard 2002). The state used its influence in state-
owned industries to attempt to undermine the powerful position 
of the trade unions by setting an example; British Leyland and the 
National Coal Board adopted a thoroughly uncompromising stance 
against the trade unions and their employees (Van Waarden 1995). 
The state deregulation policies in the 1980s and 1990s definitely 
reinforced management initiatives for more “flexibility,” eroding 
unions’ bargaining power and political strength (Bordogna and Cella 
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1999; Keller 1991).
Under the normative cultural approach, states attempt to shape 
cognitive and normative rules that guide employer behavior and 
hence employer beliefs about what constitutes rational and desirable 
behavior, while defining the status of labor in the polity, the 
economy and society as a whole (Kochan and Osterman 1994). This 
in turn alters the power relations between labor and management in 
industrial relations and even defines the fate of unions. 
The state as employer varies widely in function, organization, 
and management across countries. Diverging patterns of culture, 
history, and ideology contribute to the variation evident in policy 
and practice (Bordogna 2003; Masters et al. 2008). State policy 
also shifts back and forth in response to political and economic 
developments and does not always have the consequences intended. 
Since state managers, like the rest of us, must make do with partial 
and incomplete economic and social theories, there can be no 
guarantee that their policies, even if implemented effectively, will 
produce the intended results. Policymaking continues to be an art 
rather than a science (Adams 1993; Bean 1994; Zeitlin 1985).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The state performs four distinct roles that affect industrial 
relations. First, the state acts as a third-party regulator. It promotes 
a legal framework that establishes general ground rules in the 
procedures for collective bargaining, regulates the use of union 
sanctions and management sanctions, and acts as a conciliator, 
mediator or arbitrator in conflicts between organized labor and 
management in order to handle or avoid breakdowns in collective 
bargaining. This role of the state is significant in itself, but the 
importance of this role is enlarged when we consider its impact on 
the power relations between organized labor and management; it 
determines to a large degree substantive outcomes, such as the 
extent of union density and collective bargaining, the form and 
character of labor organization, and even the survival of organized 
labor. 
Second, the state sets labor standards and sometimes wage levels 
with less regard to the profitability of the industries to create a floor 
for employer behavior in the labor market. It regulates money supply 
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and interest rates that have significant effects on employment 
and workers as changes in product markets act on labor markets 
through derived demand. Faced with the “free-rider” problem among 
employers, the state invests into labor market institutions such 
as training, education, and employment services that shape the 
capacities bought by employees. The purpose of legislated labor 
standards is to compensate for the lack of individual workers’ 
bargaining power. Other functions of the state to achieve “full” 
employment and economic growth also affect not only employers’ 
business strategies, human resource policies, and labor policies, but 
also the balance of power within the labor market and the margins 
for negotiation within collective bargaining.
Third, the state provides individual workers with social insurance 
against employment-related risks to collect market failures (“moral 
hazard” and “adverse selection”) and sets all rights and obligations 
of individual workers within the employment relationship. In 
particular, equal employment opportunity laws attempt to correct 
social problems of interest to particular groups of workers, called 
protected classes. This role of the state to protect the labor force 
from total dependence for survival at the discretion of the employer 
not only influences all of the HRM functions, but also strengthens 
the position of workers both individually and collectively, facilitating 
the emergence and stability of collectivized industrial relations.
Fourth and finally, the state is a contracting party itself in its 
capacity as employer of public and semi-public servants and is 
by far the largest single employer in most countries. The state 
decides how it manages its workforce, selecting a model of staffing, 
compensation, and employee involvement that it wants to follow. 
Through their own employment policies, states shape cognitive and 
normative rules that guide employer behavior and hence employer 
beliefs about what constitutes rational and desirable behavior, while 
defining the status of labor in the polity, the economy, and society 
as a whole. This in turn alters the power relations between labor 
and management in industrial relations and even defines the fate of 
unions. 
There have been several notable trends in the economy since 
the 1980s: globalization of the enterprise; technological revolution; 
deregulation of economic activity; excess capacity and supply of 
basic goods; and changing demographics and attitudes of people 
(Schneider 1997). In this environment, international trade no 
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longer is a positive-sum game; it has became a battlefield in which 
each country fights for a greater share of the markets, eroding 
the fundamental condition of macro-corporatism where the state 
involves management and labor in the process of socioeconomic 
decision-making. Liberals predict that national economies and 
industrial relations systems will converge toward the neoliberal 
model, which weakens state control over employers and enhances 
employer power and authority, to survive tough international 
competition (Broad 1995; Marshall 1994; Strange 1996, 1997). 
Yet, there are significant continuities in state regulation both 
qualitatively and quantitatively despite some visible changes in 
several subfields of social policy (Benson and Gospel 2008; Boyer 
2004; Carter 2006; Erikson and Kuruvilla 1998; Traxler 1996), and 
the diverse systems of industrial relations largely can be attributed 
to differences in the nature and extent of state intervention and 
the varying roles of the state in industrial relations across different 
countries. 
The author believes that the typology proposed in this article 
significantly enhances our understanding of the role of the state 
in industrial relations and hopes that it also aids in studying the 
diverse systems of industrial relations across different countries. 
Due to the space limitation, this article could not go further to 
include a systematic historical analysis of each of the distinctive 
roles of the state in shaping the diverse systems of industrial 
relations, however. Future research should explore the validity of 
the proposed typology through systematic comparative studies.
REFERENCES
Adams, R. (1993), “Regulating Unions and Collective Bargaining: A Global, 
Historical Analysis of Determinants and Consequences,” Comparative 
Labor Law Journal, 14(3), 272-301.
    (1995), Industrial Relations under Liberal Democracy: North America in 
Comparative Perspective, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina.
Allen, S. (1994), “Developments in Collective Bargaining in Construction 
in the 1980s and 1990s,” in Contemporary Collective Bargaining in the 
Private Sector, P. Voos ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 411-446. 
Aoki, M. (1997), “Unintended Fit: Organizational Evolution and Government 
Design of Institutions in Japan,” in The Role of Government in East 
Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, M. 
120 Seoul Journal of Business
Aoki and K. Kim eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 233-253.
Aoki, M., K. Murdock, and M. Okuno-Fujwara (1997), “Beyond the East 
Asian Miracle: Introducing the Market-Enhancing View,” in The Role 
of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, M. Aoki and K. Kim eds., Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1-37.
Barbash, J. (1984a), The Elements of Industrial Relations, Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press.
    (1984b), “Trade Unionism from Roosevelt to Reagan,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 473, 11-22.  
Bean, R. (1994), Comparative Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Cross 
National Perspectives, London: Routledge.
Belman, D. and M. Belzer (1997), “Regulation of Labor Markets: Balancing 
the Benefits and Costs of Competition,” in Government Regulation of 
the Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 179-
220. 
Benson, J. and H. Gospel (2008), “The Emergent Enterprise Union? A 
Conceptual and Comparative Analysis,” The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 19(7), 1365-1382.
Black, B. (2001), “National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay 
Structures,” Labor, 15(2), 257-277. 
Bohlander, G. and S. Snell (2007), Managing Human Resources, Mason, OH: 
Thomson.
Bordogna, L. (2003), “The Reform of Public Sector Employment Relations 
in Industrialized Democracies,” in Going Public: The Role of Labor-
Management Relations in Delivering Quality Government Services, J. 
Brock and D. Lipsky eds., Champaign, IL: IRRA, 23-68. 
Bordogna, L. and G. Cella (1999), “Admission, Exclusion, Correction: the 
Changing Role of the State in Industrial Relations,” Transfer: European 
Review of Labour and Research, 5(1-2), 14-33.
Bowles, S. (1985), “The Production Process in a Comparative Economy,” 
American Economic Review, 75(1), 1165-1183.
Boyer, R. (2004), “The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but 
Still the Century of Nations?” in National Diversity and Global Capital-
ism, S. Berger and R. Dore eds., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
29-59.
Broad, D. (1995), “Globalization vs Labor,” Monthly Review, 47(7), 20-32. 
Buchanan, P. (1995), State, Labor, Capital, Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press.
Burton, J. and J. Chelius (1997), “Workplace Safety and Health Regulations: 
Rationale and Results,” in Government Regulation of the Employment 
Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 253-294. 
Burtt, E. (1979), Labor in the American Economy, New York: St. Martin’s 
The Role of the State in Industrial Relations 121
Press.
Carter, B. (2006), “The Restructuring of National States in the Global Econ-
omy,” in Globalization, State and Labor, P. Fairbrother and A. Rainnie 
eds., New York: Taylor & Francis, 136-141.
Clegg, H. (1976), Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory 
Based on Comparisons of Six Countries, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Commons, J. (1909), “American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of In-
dustrial Evolution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 24, 39-83.
Commons, J. and J. Andrews (1936), Principles of Labor Legislation, New 
York: Harper & Bros.
Craypo, C. (1997), “Alternative Perspectives on the Purpose and Effects of 
Labor Standards Legislation,” in Government Regulation of the Employ-
ment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 221-251. 
Deakin, S. and W. Njoya (2008), “The Legal Framework of Employment Re-
lations,” The Sage Handbook of Industrial Relations, P. Blyton et al. 
eds., London: Sage, 284- 304.
Dubofsky, M. (1994), The State and Labor in Modern America, Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Dunlop, J. (1958), Industrial Relations System, New York: Henry Holt.
Edmund H. and C. Frege (2006), “New Actors in Industrial Relations,” Brit-
ish Journal of Industrial Relations, 44(4), 601–604.
Erickson, C. and S. Kuruvilla (1998), “Industrial Relations System Transfor-
mation,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52, 3-21.
Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (1985), “On the Road toward A 
More Adequate Understanding of the State,” in Bringing the State Back 
in, P. Evans et al. eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 203-
226.
Falkner, G. and T. Emmerich (1994), “The Role of the State within Social 
Policy,” West European Politics, 17(3), 52-76.
Feldacker, B. (1990), Labor Guide to Labor Law, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren-
tice-Hall.
Ferner, A. and R. Hyman (1998), Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Fisher, C., L. Schoenfeldt, and J. Shaw (1996), Human Resource Manage-
ment, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.
Fossum, J. (2006), Labor Relations: Development, Structure, Process, New 
York: McGraw-Hill-Irwin.
Frenkel, S. and J. Harrod (1995), “Labor, Management, and Industrial Rela-
tions: Themes and Issues in International Perspective,” in Industrializa-
tion & Labor Relations: Contemporary Research in Seven Countries, S. 
Frenkel and J. Harrod eds., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 3-22.
Galbraith, J. (1994), “Countervailing Power: Memoir and Modern Reality,” in 
Labor Economics and Industrial Relations: Markets and Institutions, C. 
122 Seoul Journal of Business
Kerr and P. Staudohar eds., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
431-434.
Giles, A. (1989), “Industrial Relations Theory, the State, and Politics,” in 
Theories and Concepts of Comparative Industrial Relations, J. Barbash 
and K. Barbash eds., Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina 
Press, 123-154.
Godard, J. (2002), “Institutional Environments, Employer Practices, and 
States in Liberal Market Economies,” Industrial Relations, 41(2), 249-
286.
Haggard, S. (1990), Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in 
the Newly Industrializing Countries, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press.
Hardin, P., J. Higgins, C. Hexter, and J. Neighbours (2002), The Developing 
Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act, 
Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs. 
Heckscher, C. (1988), The New Unionism, New York: Basic Books.
Holley, W. and K. Jennings (1980), The Labor Relations Process, Hinsdale, 
IL: Dryden Press.
Howell, C. (1995), “Trade Unions and the State: A Critique of British Indus-
trial Relations,” Politics & Society, 23(2), 149-83.
Hyman, R. (2008), “The State in Industrial Relations,” The Sage Handbook 
of Industrial Relations, P. Blyton et al. eds., London: Sage, 258-283.
Inagami, T. and H. Whittaker (2005), The New Community Firm, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson, G. (2003), “Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: 
Liberalization Pressures and Responses,” in The End of Diversity? 
Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism, K. Yamamura and W. 
Streeck eds., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 261-305.
Jacobi, O., B. Keller and W. Müller-Jentsch (1998), “Germany: Facing New 
Challenges,” in Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, A. Ferner and R. 
Hyman eds., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 190-238.
Jacobi, S. (2005), The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and 
Employment Relations in Japan and the United States, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Jacobs, D. and M. Dixon (2003), “The Determinants of Success or Failure 
in Class Politics: A Contingent Analysis of Political Disputes between 
Labor and Management,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 
16, 2003.
Jeong, D. Y. and R. Aguilera (2008), “The Evolution of Enterprise Unionism 
in Japan: A Socio-Political Perspective,” British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 46(1): 98-132. 
Jessop, B. (2002), The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity.
The Role of the State in Industrial Relations 123
Kahn-Freund, O. (1954), “Legal Framework,” in The System of Industrial 
Relations in Britain, A Flanders and H. Clegg eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 
42-127.
Katz, H. and O. Darbishire (2000), Converging Divergences, Ithaca, NY: ILR 
Press.
Katz, H., T. Kochan and A. Colvin (2008), An Introduction to Collective 
Bargaining and Industrial Relations, New York: McGraw Hill 
Kaufman, B. (1997a), “Labor Markets and Employment Regulations: The 
View of the ‘Old’ Institutionalists,” in Government Regulation of the 
Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 11-55. 
   . (1997b), “Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship,” 
in Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman 
ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 1-9. 
Keller, B. (1991), “The Role of the State as Corporate Actor in Industrial 
Relations Systems,” in Comparative Industrial Relations: Contemporary 
Research and Theory, R. Adams ed., London: Harper Collins Academic, 
76-93.
Kelly, D., A. Holmes and R. Hayward (2005), Business Law, New York: 
Routledge-Cavendish.
Kelly, J. (1998), Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism 
and Long Waves, London: Routledge.
Kochan, T. and P. Osterman (1994), The Mutual Gains Enterprises, Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
LeRoy, M. (1998), “The Path of the Law and the Future of Employee 
Involvement in Workplace Teams,” in Research in Personnel and Human 
Resources Management, G. Ferris and K. Rowland eds., London: JAI 
Press, 295-330.
LeRoy, M. and J. Johnson (2001), “Death by Lethal Injunction: National 
Emergency Strikes under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right 
to Strike,” Arizona Law Review, 63(1), 63-137.
Lind, J. and I. Møller (2006), “Activation for what purpose? Lessons from 
Denmark,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 26, 5-19. 
Marshall, R. (1994), “Internationalisation: Implications for Workers,” Journal 
of International Affairs, 48(1), 59-77.
Masters, M., R. Gibney, I. Shevchuk, and T. Zagenczyk (2008), “The State as 
Employer,” in The Sage Handbook of Industrial Relations, P. Blyton et 
al. eds., London: Sage, 305-324.
Offe, C. and H. Wiesenthal (1980), “Two Logics of Collective Action: 
Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form,” Political 
Power and Social Theory, 1, 67-115.
Olson, M. (1968), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Oppenheimer, A. (2004), “Investigating Workplace Harassment and 
124 Seoul Journal of Business
Discrimination,” Employee Relations Law Journal, 29(4), 56-68.
Pencavel, J. (2003), “Company Unions, Wages, and Hours,” Advances in 
Industrial and Labor Relations, 12, 7–38.
Rimlinger, V. (1977), “Labor and the Government: A Comparative Historical 
Perspective,” Journal of Economic History, 37(1), 210-25.
Schneider, T. (1997), “The Choice Is Simple: A Strong independent Labor 
Movement or Federal Government Regulation,” in Government 
Regulation of the Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, 
WI: IRRA, 521-531. 
Shostak, A. and D. Skocik (1986), The Air Controllers’ Controversy: Lessons 
from the PATCO Strike, New York: Human Sciences Press.
Sinyai, C. (2006), Schools of Democracy: A Political History of the American 
Labor Movement, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Strange, S. (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    (1997), “The Future of Global Capitalism; Or, Will Divergence 
Persist Forever?,” in Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping 
Convergence and Diversity, C. Crouch and W. Streeck eds., Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 182-191.
Streeck, W. (1987), “The Uncertainties of Management in the Management 
of Uncertainty,” Work, Management and Society, 1(3), 281-308.
Streeck, W. and P. Schmitter (1985), “Community, Market, State—and 
Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to 
Social Order,” in Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State, 
W. Streck and P. Schmitter eds., London: Sage, 1-29. 
Streeck, W. and A. Hassel (2003), “Trade Unions as Political Actors,” in 
International Handbook of Trade Unions, J. Addison and C. Schnabel 
eds., London: Edward Elgar, 335-365.
Sturmthal, A. (1973), “Industrial Relations Strategies,” in The International 
Labor Movement in Transition, A. Sturmthal and J. Scoville eds., 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1-33.
Taras, D. (1997), “Collective Bargaining Regulation in Canada and the 
United States: Divergent Cultures, Divergent Outcomes,” in Government 
Regulation of the Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, 
WI: IRRA, 295-341. 
Tilly, C. (1985), “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in 
Brining the State Back In, P. Evans et al. eds., New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 169–191. 
Traxler, F. (1996), “Collective Bargaining and Industrial Change: A Case of 
Disorganization? A Comparative Analysis of Eighteen OECD Countries,” 
European Sociological Review, 12(3), 271-287.
Van Waarden, F. (1995), “Government Intervention in Industrial Relations“, 
in Comparative Industrial and Employment Relations, J. Van 
The Role of the State in Industrial Relations 125
Ruysseveldt et al. eds., London: Sage, 109-133.
Walsh, D. (2004), Employment Law for Human Resource Management, 
Mason, OH: South-Western.
Weil, D. (1997), “Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the 
Determinants of Regulatory Performance,” in Government Regulation of 
the Employment Relationship, B. Kaufman ed., Madison, WI: IRRA, 429-
474. 
Weiler, P. (1990), Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and 
Employment Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Woo-Cummings, M. (1997), “The Political Economy of Growth in East 
Asia: A Perspective on the State, Market, and Ideology,” in The Role 
of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, M. Aoki et al. eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 323-
341.
Zeitlin, J. (1985), “Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: A Contradictory 
Relationship,” in Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives, S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin eds., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-45.
Received August 23, 2010
Revision received September 17, 2010
Accepted October 12, 2010

